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THE H1CKENLOOPER AMENDMENTS: PERU'S SEIZURE
OF INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY
AS A TEST CASE
During 1968 and early 1969 several Latin American countries
expropriated American owned property within their borders.' In
some cases compensation has been made or guaranteed by the for-
eign governments. However, in at least one notable expropriation
situation, the seizure of all the assets of the International Petro-
leum Company (IPC) 2 by the government of Peru, compensation
has not been made or guaranteed. The Hickenlooper Amendments
to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act are intended to insure that Amer-
ican owners are compensated for expropriated property. 3 The purpose
of this comment is to examine the legal effects of these Amendments
on the rights of IPC to compensation for the expropriated property.
The Amendments' impact on the existing foreign commercial interests
of American property owners will also be examined. 4
I. THE PERUVIAN SEIZURE OF IPC
The seizure of IPC's assets was preceded by a long history of
antagonism between the Company and several Peruvian administra-
tions. The current dispute between IPC and the present military
junta of General Juan Velasco Alvaredo derives from the unique type
of ownership claimed by IPC in northern Peruvian oilfields. Owner-
ship of property in Latin America extends, almost universally, only
to the surface; the subsoil is owned by the state and is worked on
a concession granted by the state.' However, IPC claims full title
on the basis of a deed in fee simple, given in 1826 by Simon Bolivar
to a citizen of Peru, which included rights to both the surface and
1 For example, in June, 1969, Peru issued a land reform decree, calling for an im-
mediate takeover of the sugar holdings of Grace & Company. Peru also informed the Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Company that its property would be nationalized in
mid-August. In Chile, President Frei agreed with the Anaconda Chemical Company on a
nationalization plan. Anaconda agreed soley to avoid outright expropriation. Other ex-
amples are readily available. See 67 U.S. News & World Rep., July 14, 1969, at 68-69;
Fortune, October, 1969, at 99.
2 IPC is incorporated in Canada, but 99.942% is owned by the American-incor-
porated Standard Oil Company (N.J.). All of IPC's principal oilfields and refineries are
located in Peru; its management headquarters are in Coral Gables, Florida. See Hearings
on United States Relations with Peru Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the Senate Comm, on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
a 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) & (2) (1964).
4 The present inquiry is based largely on statutory interpretation since the 1962
Amendment has been applied only once, 1969 Hearings at 55, and the 1964 Amendment
has also had little application. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat. City Bank,
270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush, 256 F.
Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Present v. United States Life Ins. Co., 96 N.J. Super. 285, 232
A.2d 853 (1967).
5 1969 Hearings at 86.
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the subsoil of the oilfields.' The property was subsequently trans-
ferred twice more before it was sold in 1888 to a group of British
citizens who leased it to the London and Pacific Petroleum Company
which subleased the property to IPC. In 1922, a dispute between
the British citizens and Peru over ownership of the subsoil was ap-
parently settled by an arbitral award which recognized the British
citizens' ownership of the subsoil and settled important questions
of taxation. In 1924, IPC bought the land outright.?
The dispute over ownership rights continued sporadically after
IPC became the owner of the oilfields.' In July, 1968, IPC proposed
a solution which was accepted with certain changes by the govern-
ment of Fernando Belaunde Terry, the elected President of Peru.
However, political opponents of Terry felt that the final agreement
was unfavorable to Peruvian interests, and on October 3, 1968, over-
threw the government and replaced it with the present military junta.
On October 4, the military junta annulled the agreement by decree'
and a few days later it expropriated IPC's assets. Four months later,
the junta presented IPC with a bill for $690.5 million claiming it was
a debt owed to the government for the illegal extraction of oil." The
junta is apparently willing to credit the value of IPC's plant to reduce
the debt."
IPC has unsuccessfully employed various methods under Peru-
vian law to recover the value of the plant; its latest appeal has re-
6 Id. at 98. The deed was granted in 1826 in payment of a debt incurred in Peru's
War of Independence. The New Republic, April 12, 1969, at 15. Apparently IPC is the
only landowner in Peru claiming the ownership of both surface and subsoil. 1969 Hearings
at 86.
7 For a full statement of the background and current situation of IPC in Peru see
Memorandum from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), "The La Brea Y Parinas Controversy—A
Resume," March, 1969 [hereinafter cited as 1969 Memorandum]. For an accurate state-
ment of the facts see Fortune, March, 1969, at 55; The New Republic, April 12, 1969,
at 15. For a detailed discussion of the arbitral award, see 1969 Hearings at 108.
8 In 1957, IPC attempted to change its unique type of ownership by giving up this
ownership in exchange for a grant of concession. The government of Peru would not
accept this proposal. In 1963, a law was passed which retroactively annulled the 1922
arbitral award and all enabling legislation leading to the award. In July, 1967, the
Peruvian Congress declared the mineral rights at the IPC oilfields to be the property of
the government. 1969 Hearings at 99.
9 See 1969 Memorandum at 15, where Peruvian Decree Law No. 3 of Oct. 4, 1968 is
discussed.
19 The "debt" purportedly represents the value of the crude oil and natural gas.
produced by the oilfields from 1924 until 1968. Thus, the Peruvian government claimed
that IPC had been illegally extracting oil for 44 years. See Fortune, March, 1969, at 55.
IPC has been the largest taxpayer in Peru and has paid taxes to the Peruvian government
continually for 44 years. These taxes have been accepted and used by the government. See
1969 Memorandum at 25.
11
 The value of the physical plant has been set at $71 million by the Peruvian gov-
ernment. A check for this amount was recently deposited by the Peruvian government in
the government bank as "compensation" to IPC for its property. However, the money
was immediately attached by the Peruvian government and applied against the $690.5
million "debt." Thus, it is questionable whether there has been any actual compensation.
See 1969 Hearings at 104.
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cently been rejected by Peru's Ministry of Energy and Mines. This
appeal was the last avenue of redress for IPC under current Peru-
vian law." President Nixon has engaged the services of Ambassador
John Irwin in an effort to resolve the dispute through negotiations.
Progress thus far has been negligible and hopes for a solution ac-
ceptable to both sides are dwindling."
Considering the facts of the IPC case, it is probable that Peru
will not adequately compensate the Company for its holdings and
the Hickenlooper Amendments may come into operation. The Amend-
ments will be examined to determine whether Peru has violated
them and, if so, what the practical results of their application to
this case might be. The effectiveness of the Amendments as attempts
to protect private foreign investment will be evaluated and their
interrelationship considered.
II. THE 1962 HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT 14
The 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment requires the President to
sever United States aid to governments which expropriate American
owned property without compensation.15 The enactment of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment of 1962 was probably the immediate result of
the taking of the Brazilian holdings of the International Telephone
and Telegraph Company by the government of Brazil." The Senate
determined that although such expropriations might occur for justi-
fiable reasons, a new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was
needed to protect American property owners against "arbitrary" sei-
zures.' 7 A collateral purpose of the 1962 Amendment was to encourage
more American investment in less developed countries by establish-
ing increased security for American holdings." The purpose of the
12 Peruvian law, however, is not stable. Some believed that the recent administrative
proceeding could not occur until IPC paid the entire $690.5 million to the court. This
was apparently changed by the Peruvian government according to Secretary of State
Rogers who, on April 7th, was still not certain of the proper legal procedure. For the
report of the news conference where he discussed the IPC affair see 60 Dep't State Bull.
357, 363 (1969).
18 For a discussion of Ambassador Irwin's mission and progress see 60 Dep't State
Bull. 357, 406.
14 The first Hickenlooper Amendment was passed in 1962 and will hereinafter be
referred to as the 1962 Amendment; the second, passed in 1964, will be termed the 1964
Amendment.
18 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) (1964). If the President took this action in the IPC case,
Peru would lose direct foreign assistance of $34 million per year. In addition, preferential
purchases of Peruvian sugar subsidize the country to the extent of $45 million per year.
66 U.S. News & World Rep., March 3, 1969, at 68. The flow of new investments into
Peru has virtually ceased pending the outcome of the IPC situation. Approximately $600
million in new investments have been postponed by United States companies alone. 67
U.S. News & World Rep., July 14, 1969, at 68.
16 S. Rep. No. 1535, S/th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962). The 1962 Amendment was also
the result of the vast number of American holdings which were expropriated by the
government of Cuba without compensation. See 1969 Hearings at 55.
IT S. Rep, No. 1535, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1962).
18
 Id. at 37. For further indications of the Congressional intent see Hearings on the
79
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Senate, then, was two-fold: to make certain that American taxpayers
were not rewarding unfair and uncompensated expropriations of
American owned property by foreign governments, and to encourage
more American investment in the underdeveloped countries by as-
suring potential investors that the United States would exert all
possible pressure to insure the security of their property.
For the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment to be applicable to the
Peruvian situation, two prerequisites must be met. First, the Amend-
ment requires that one of three substantive subsections be violated.
Secondly, if such a violation occurs, it is necessary that the offending
government fail to take "appropriate steps" to discharge its obliga-
tions under international law, including speedy compensation for the
confiscated property.
Subsection A of the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment provides
that a violation occurs if the government of a country "has nation-
alized or expropriated or seized ownership or control of property
owned by any United States citizen. . . ." 19 No formal declaration of
expropriation is necessary, as the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee recognized the necessity of preventing not only formal, outright
expropriation without compensation, but also "creeping expropriation"
which is more difficult to detect and, consequently, to control." It
is clear that the physical takeover of the IPC plant is the type of
action which the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment sought to prevent
and is violative of the terms of subsection A. The language of the
statute as well as the legislative intent lead to the conclusion that
Peru has violated Subsection A of the 1962 Amendment by seizing
control of IPC's
Peru's assertion of the "debt" of $690.5 million also amounts
to a violation of Subsection A of the 1962 Amendment. It is an ex-
ample of "creeping expropriation" sought to be avoided by the Senate
Committee. Even if Peru credits IPC for the full value of its plant
to offset part of the "debt", the result would still be the nationaliza-
tion, expropriation or seizure of control of its plant since IPC would
receive no actual compensation. This interpretation accords with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's desire that the term "confisca-
tion" be "construed broadly and not in a narrow technical sense."'
The government of Peru, moreover, has explicitly stated that it
was expropriating the property." This is tantamount to an admission
that subsection A has been violated. The Peruvian government has
claimed, however that IPC did not have clear title to the land, and,
therefore, the taking of the land was not expropriation since the state
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 991-1079 (1965).
10 22 U.S.C.	 2370(e) (1)(A) (1964).
20
 See S. Rep, No. 588, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
21 See 1969 Hearings at 101.
22 S. Rep. No. 588, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
23 See 1969 Hearings at 101.
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already owned the land.' It is submitted, however, that the facts
indicate IPC did possess title to the land." Moreover, the Peruvian
government's recognition of IPC's ownership for over 44 years should
estop Peru from asserting ownership at the present time." For the
purposes of this comment, therefore, it will be assumed that IPC
possessed clear title to the land.
Peru also violated Subsection B of the 1962 Hickenlooper Amend-
ment which severs aid to a country which has "taken steps to repudi-
ate or nullify existing contracts or agreements with any United States
citizen. . . ."27
 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee desired to
promote stability in contracts between foreign governments and Amer-
ican owners." Subsection B seeks to prevent disregard by foreign
governments of contracts and agreements with American companies.
Peru, however, has annulled such an existing contract with IPC. An
agreement intended to settle the question of IPC's property rights in
Peru was made and signed by the government of Peru on August 12,
1968.22 After the takeover by the military junta, the agreement was
annulled by military decree.' This action was a clear violation of
Subsection B of the 1962 Amendment.
Subsection C provides that the sanctions of the Amendment be
applied to any government which has "imposed or enforced discrim-
inatory taxes or other exactions. . . ." 31 The imposition of the $690.5
million "debt" would appear to be the exaction of such a "discrimina-
tory tax." The "debt" was imposed on the basis of Peru's contention
that IPC was a trespasser acting in bad faith, and must, therefore,
indemnify Peru for the oil it has extracted since it bought the land
in 1924.32 However, since it has been assumed that IPC owned the
land, it is clear that the "debt" represents a discriminatory tax. Thus,
while it is not essential to the application of the 1962 Hickenlooper
Amendment that all three subsections be violated, arguably, the
Peruvian government has violated all three subsections.
Since Peru has clearly violated the substantive subsections of
the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment, the provisions of the Amendment
dealing with the steps which Peru must take to avoid the discontin-
24 Id. at 99-100.
25 See pp. 77-78 supra.
26
 Although estoppel against a state is used very rarely, it is submitted that the con-
duct of Peru, not only in collecting taxes for 44 years, but, more importantly, in listing
IPC as having valid title to the oilfields in the Public Registry and in allowing IPC to
rely on this recognition of its ownership for over 40 years to the detriment of the Com-
pany, constitutes proper grounds to estop Peru from presently claiming title. See generally
Annot., 1 A.L.R,2d 338 (1948).
27
 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(B) (1964).
28 S. Rep. No. 588, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
29 1969 Memorandum at 9-13.
2° 1969 Hearings at 101.
31 22	 § 2370(e) (1)(C) (1964).
32 Fortune, March, 1969, at 55.
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uance of aid are called into operation. This section of the Amendment
states that the President shall suspend aid if
such country . . . fails within a reasonable time (not more
than six months after such action . . .) to take appropriate
steps, which may include arbitration, to discharge its obli-
gations under international law ... including speedy com-
pensation . . . [N]o other provision of this chapter shall be
construed to authorize the President to waive the provisions
of this subsection."
Before determining whether Peru has taken "appropriate steps
to discharge its obligations under international law," it must be
pointed out that the nature of Peru's obligations under international
law is subject to varying interpretations. It is unclear whether the
architects of the Hickenlooper Amendment would necessarily be in
agreement with various authorities in international law. For example,
the Amendment requires speedy compensation to the former owner as
an element of international law. Certain international law authorities
agree that the acts of a government in depriving an alien of his prop-
erty must be followed by a grant of adequate compensation.' Many
international lawyers believe that any compensation which is merely
nominal, or is indefinitely postponed, is contrary to international law."3
The official position of the United States Department of State is that
international law demands "just" or "fair" compensation and that
standard "cannot be abrogated by local legislation."" However, other
authorities have stated that there is a serious question whether inter-
national law requires compensation at all."'
Thus, there is disagreement as to what international law re-
quires in the way of compensation for expropriated property. How-
ever, the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment specifically makes speedy
compensation an element of international law, and while
the U.S. Congress cannot, of course, make international law,
it can indicate the Congressional belief as to what inter-
national law in a particular area is. This is what it has at-
tempted to do here with respect to compensation for the
taking of the property of aliens."$
Thus, since Peru has not, as yet, speedily compensated IPC for the
expropriated property it is apparent that Peru has not satisfied this
33 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) (1964),
34 M . Sorenson, Manual of Public International Law 486 (1968). See G. Schwarzen-
berger, A Manual of International Law 106 (5th ed. 1967). See also 48 Dep't State
Bull. 787 (1963) where a U.N. resolution declaring that an owner must be paid "appro-
priate compensation" is discussed. See also 60 Dep't State Bull. 406-07 (1969).
85 See J. Starke, An Introduction to International Law 258 (6th ed. 1962).
38 29 Dep't State Bull. 357 (1953).
37 1969 Hearings at 77.
38 Levie, Sequel to Sabbatino, 59 Am. J. Int'l L. 369 n.17 (1965).
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particular obligation under international law as required by the 1962
Amendment.
Since Peru has not fulfilled its international law obligations
under the Hickenlooper Amendment, it remains to be determined
whether it has taken "appropriate steps" toward that end. The Peru-
vian court appeals which IPC lost, as well as the administrative action
which it has recently pursued" were such "appropriate steps" since a
decision favorable to IPC would have prevented the Amendment from
becoming operative against Peru. 4° However, these remedies have been
exhausted" and apparently the only negotiations with respect to the
IPC situation are the sporadic discussions between Ambassador Irwin
and the Peruvian government. While the Amendment states that arbi-
tration is an "appropriate step," no other guidelines as to what consti-
tutes such steps are provided. It is submitted that the intermittent
negotiations between the United States and Peru are not "appropriate
steps" since "speedy compensation" has not been forthcoming." Un-
less IPC and Peru begin arbitration, it appears that at present, no
"appropriate steps" are being taken and the decision whether to dis-
continue financial assistance to Peru is left with the President.
Having determined that the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment is
clearly violated unless "appropriate steps" are taken, it becomes
necessary to determine whether the President has discretion in ap-
plying the sanctions of the Amendment, or whether he is compelled
to discontinue aid. The legislative history of the 1962 Amendment
as well as recent statements by the Department of State and the
current administration indicate that the Amendment was both in-
tended and is presently interpreted to be mandatory. The Senate
Report on the 1962 Amendment states that the President is "required
to suspend assistance" if the provisions of the Act have been vi-
olated.43 More recently, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs has said that although he might question the wisdom
of the Amendment, the "law exists and it will be implemented. . . 7744
The Nixon Administration realizes the mandatory nature of the
Amendment as evidenced by Secretary of State Rogers' statement
that there is a "deadline, mandated by law, which faces us should
Peru fail to take appropriate steps toward a solution."' Moreover,
this is the only reasonable interpretation of the Amendment, for it
39 For a general discussion of the procedures employed by IPC see 1969 Memo-
randum at 14-24.
4 ° 60 Dep't State Bull. 357 (1969).
41 As has been previously noted, however, Peruvian procedural law is not clear.
See note 12 supra.
42 One authority has stated that the Congressional intent was that all negotiations
must be in "good faith" in order to constitute "appropriate steps" under the 1962
Amendment. 1969 Hearings at 72-73.
43 S. Rep. No. 1535, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1962); 1969 Hearings at 55.
44 60 Dep't State Bull. 407 (1969).
43 Id. at 310.
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states that the President "shall suspend assistance. . . .;240 (Emphasis
added.)
The 1962 Amendment specifies that "appropriate steps" must
be commenced within a six month period to avoid the mandatory
sanctions of the Amendment. In the IPC case, "appropriate steps"
were taken during the six month period. However, since the "ap-
propriate steps" did not result in a satisfactory settlement, and it
appears that all good faith bargaining has since terminated, it is
arguable that immediate suspension of aid must occur since the six
month period has elapsed. This is the only reasonable interpretation
of the section because the sanctions of the Amendment could be
avoided by merely beginning negotiations within six months and then
terminating them.47
The only discretion which the President may have under the
1962 Amendment is whether to continue the suspension of aid. The
suspension must continue until the "President is satisfied that ap-
propriate steps are being taken . ." Thus, the President may then
order a resumption of aid, although he need not. However, in the
IPC case assistance has not yet been discontinued by the President,
although it is likely that he will become bound to discontinue it in
light of Peru's clear violations of the Amendment and the lack of
"appropriate steps" toward compensation."
III. THE 1964 HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT
From the standpoint of IPC or any other similarly situated
company, it may make no practical difference whether the President
invokes the sanctions of the 1962 Amendment. The discontinuance
of United States foreign aid to Peru does not guarantee compensa-
tion for IPC. The underlying purpose of the 1962 Amendment was
to force foreign governments to compensate American owners of
expropriated property by threatening suspension of United States
foreign assistance. However, strong political and socio-economic fac-
tors make it uncertain whether any compensation will be forthcoming
in the IPC case, even if the sanctions of the 1962 Amendment are em-
ployed."
IPC, however, is not left without a remedy. In 1964, Congress
enacted a second Hickenlooper Amendment" intended to insure the
right to seek compensation for expropriated property in United States
46 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1964).
47 This interpretation also supports the mandatory nature of the Amendment. Thus,
if good faith negotiations have terminated, even though commenced within the six month
period, the sanctions should be applied. See note 42 supra.
48 it should be noted that it is unlikely that IPC or any other party could force
presidential action by a mandamus proceeding.
99 The complex state of Peruvian politics, society and economics will certainly exert
some effect on the results of the present controversy. See the testimony of Mr. ',flitch
and Mr. Goodwin, 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 53-98.
50 22 U.S.C. § 2370(0 (2) (1964), This Amendment is also referred to as the "Sab-
batino Amendment" and the "Rule of Law Amendment."
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courts.5 ' To accomplish this purpose, the Amendment reversed the
effects of a recent Supreme Court decision denying recovery in a
similar case on the basis of the so-called "act of state" doctrine. In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 52 the Court found against
an American merchant who was attempting to obtain the proceeds
from the sale of sugar which had been expropriated from him by
the government of Cuba. 53
 The Court did not reach the merits, nor
did it determine whether the Cuban expropriation was valid under
either United States or international law. Its decision was based on
an exhaustive discussion and reaffirmation of the "act of state" 54
doctrine which states:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another done
within its own territory.'
Thus, under this doctrine federal courts would not judge the acts
of a foreign government, including expropriation, and the American
owner of confiscated property was left virtually without remedy in
United States courts.
The 1964 Hickenlooper Amendment overcomes •
 this disability by
providing in part:
[N] o court in the United States shall decline on the ground
of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international
law in a case in which a claim of title or other right is as-
serted by any party . . . based upon . . . a confiscation or
other taking . . . by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of
compensation . . . set out in this subsection. . . 56
The 1964 Amendment provides two exceptions to this general rule.
Its provisions will not be applicable if the President determines that
it is in the foreign policy interests of the nation to apply the "act
of state" doctrine, or if the act of the foreign government is not
contrary to international law. The question thus becomes whether IPC
can successfully bring suit against the Peruvian government in a court
51 Senator Hickenlooper has stated: "[Nasically, the amendment is designed to assure
that the private litigant is granted his day in court." 110 Cong. Rec. 19547 (1964).
52 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For a discussion of the decision see 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143,
300 (1964). See also 21 Vand. L. Rev. 388 (1968).
53 Over one billion dollars worth of American property has been expropriated in
Cuba. J. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy 534 (2d ed. 1965).
54 376 U.S. at 427-37.
55 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
53 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1964). The Amendment has been held constitutional.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968).
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of the United States under the 1964 Hickenlooper Amendment, and,
if so, what the court can award IPC."
To bring suit IPC must demonstrate that it comes within the terms
of the 1964 Amendment by proving that it has a "claim of title or
other right to property based on a confiscation or other taking"' by
Peru. The laws promulgated by the Peruvian military junta clearly
announced the taking." Moreover, IPC's title to the property seems
to have been established; thus, this requirement has been satisfied.
The second prerequisite is that the expropriation must have
violated international law. If the court determines that such a
violation has not occurred, the 1964 Amendment does not apply
and the "act of state" doctrine would be applied." It has been
demonstrated that Peru's confiscation of IPC's property did violate
international law because the 1962 Amendment makes speedy com-
pensation, equivalent to the full value of the expropriated property,
a requirement of international law." The 1964 Amendment spe-
cifically adopts the international law standards set out in the 1962
Amendment.° Thus, Peru has violated the international law provi-
sion of the 1964 Amendment by failing to provide adequate compen-
sation.
The only remaining bar to litigation of IPC's rights in a United
States court is the President's discretionary power to invoke the
"act of state" doctrine.° The President would take such action if
it were determined that a trial on the merits would not be in the
national interest. If the President had applied the sanctions of the
1962 Amendment, it is probable that it would not be considered to
be in the national interest to allow a private suit by IPC in United
States courts. Even if the sanctions of the 1962 Amendment are
applied against Peru, it is probable that negotiations for compensa-
tion will continue. In such a case, the possibility of a United States
court judgment against Peru might impede a negotiated settlement
with Peru. If, by the time a suit was instituted, it was apparent
that a settlement was unlikely, the President would probably allow
the case to continue as the danger to negotiations would then be
minimal.
57 It is possible that the government of Peru might sue IPC for the $690.5 million
"debt." If this should occur, IPC would probably counterclaim for the value of the plant
as well as raise defenses. In such a situation, there would be no need to apply the 1964
Amendment since Peru would have put itself in court, thereby submitting itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. See A. Ehrenzweig 8: D. Louisell, Jurisdiction in a Nutshell
117 (2d ed. 1968).
58 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
59 1969 Memorandum, supra note 6, at 15.
60
 See 23 U. Miami L. Rev. 243, 247 (1969).
01 See p. 82 supra.
02 See 1964 Amendment, p. 85 supra.
88 The President may determine that the "act of state" doctrine is required by the
foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to that effect would then
be filed in that case with the court. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1964).
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If the President allows the suit to continue, the court will then
have to consider whether Peru's probable defense of sovereign im-
munity requires dismissal of IPC's claim. There has been no clear
statement of the effects of this defense on the operation of the 1964
Hickenlooper Amendment. Before its enactment, a foreign country
was free to raise a defense of sovereign immunity in any litigation.
With the issuance of the Tate Letter in 1952," however, the State
Department suggested that the defense of sovereign immunity no
longer be considered absolute and it further suggested that the de-
fense be limited to the jure imperii, the public governmental functions
of a state. Thus, the Tate Letter urged that sovereign immunity
should not protect foreign governments from answering in United
States courts for jus gestionis, their purely commercial undertakings.
The State Department position necessitated a case by case examina-
tion of the government action involved." Because the taking of IPC's
property in Peru was clearly a public governmental function of that
country, had it occurred before the passage of the 1964 Amendment,
Peru could have successfully raised the defense of sovereign im-
munity relying on the Tate Letter. It remains to be determined
whether the defense is still available in light of the 1964 Amend-
ment.
A United States district court has declared that the right to
claim sovereign immunity was not altered by the passage of the 1964
Amendment. American Hawaiian Ventures Inc. v. 1 I .V Latuharhary"
involved a suit by an American corporation against a corporation
owned by the Indonesian government which confiscated the plaintiff's
rubber plantations. The court stated that "the Amendment does not
bear on the threshold question of whether this Court's jurisdiction
over Indonesia would be defeated by its right to sovereign immunity
for acts of jure imperii."" The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
announced that sovereign immunity would be granted any nation at
the request of the United States Department of State." In a suit
involving a Delaware corporation seeking compensation from Ven-
ezuela for the alleged confiscation of property, a vigorous dissent de-
clared that sovereign immunity is a "colossal effrontery, a brazen
repudiation of international moral principles, it is a shameless fraud.
64 It should be noted that usually the law of the place of the wrong controls. How-
ever, if foreign policy demands otherwise, the forum law will prevail. In effect, this is
what would happen if the Hickenlooper Amendment were applied in the Peruvian situa-
tion.
The Hickenlooper Amendment ... vitiates the act of state doctrine's bar, allows
forum policy to prevail, and states that the forum policy requires compensation
for expropriation. Thus, the law of the United States was applied to the acts of
the Cuban government within its own territory.
21 Vand. L. Rev. 388, 393 (1968).
06 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952).
66 257 F. Supp. 622 (DN.J. 1966).
87 Id. at 626.
68 Chemical Natural Resources Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 147, 215 A.2d 864,
869 (1966).
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. . . ," thus indicating the view that sovereign immunity should not
be allowed to defeat the purposes of the Amendment.
It is submitted that the defense of sovereign immunity should
not be allowed in a case to which the 1964 Hickenlooper Amendment
is applicable and which the President allows to proceed. In enacting
the 1964 Amendment Congress desired the President to have the
only voice which could prevent a hearing on the merits in an expro-
priation situation. Sovereign immunity should not be allowed to frus-
trate that intent."
Assuming that the President would not ask for the application of
the "act of state" doctrine and the sovereign immunity defense hurdle
could be overcome, it is suggested that at a trial in a United States
court Peru would counterclaim for $690.5 million, the amount of the
alleged "debt." The counterclaim would only be put forth if Peru was
convinced that its defense of sovereign immunity would not be ac-
cepted, for once a counterclaim is made, sovereign immunity is
waived.71
 It has been concluded that IPC had valid title to the land
prior to the expropriation and, therefore, the $690.5 million "debt"
is invalid."
Assuming the court's agreement with this position, it remains to
be determined how a judgment against Peru could be enforced. Since
the jurisdiction of United States courts extends only to property within
United States territory," it is apparent that a judgment in IPC's favor
could only be satisfied out of Peruvian property located in the United
States. It is questionable, however, whether property of the Peruvian
government, other than confiscated property which is shipped into
the United States, could be used to satisfy the judgment." However,
in situations where the foreign government shipped the confiscated
property to the United States, the possibility of satisfaction of a judg-
ment would be increased proportionately. Thus, even assuming the
1964 Hickenlooper Amendment may permit a decision on the merits
of the Peruvian seizure, it is unlikely that a decision favorable to IPC
would result in adequate compensation. .
41° Id. at 194, 215 A.2d at 893.
70 It has been argued that a party who could pass all of the other hurdles of the
1964 Amendment would "founder on the rock of sovereign immunity . . . at the very
outset." Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment—International Law Meets Civil Proce-
dure, 59 Am. J. Int'l L. 899, 907 (1965).
71 Sovereign immunity can be waived by the bringing of suit by a sovereign or the
imposition of a counterclaim. See 420 Pa. at 143, 215 A.2d at 867 (1966).
72 Although title to land cannot be affected by a judgment of any state not the situs
of the land, a United States court can seek to provide compensation for its unlawful
taking. See 1 J. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 423 (1935).
73 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 98 (1934). A United States court in dealing
with the IPC problem would not attempt to affect the property in Peru in any way.
Rather, it would simply allow satisfaction of the judgment out of the property located
in the United States.
74 One authority has suggested that any claims for money be satisfied only out of
the actual expropriated property as it is shipped into the United States. For a discussion
of this issue see Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 Before the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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The interrelationship of the 1962 Amendment with the 1964
Amendment may also prevent IPC from receiving compensation. The
applicability or non-applicability of the 1962 Hickenlooper Amend-
ment affects in no theoretical way a court action based on the 1964
Amendment. Even if the President applied the sanctions of the 1962
Amendment, a United States corporation could still bring suit in an
American court. However, it is arguable that the "act of state" doctrine
of the 1964 Amendment would be applied by the President in a case
if negotiations were in progress under the "appropriate steps" section
of the 1962 Amendment. If such negotiations were discontinued by the
United States, it is arguable that an American court action under the
1964 Amendment should be allowed to proceed. The President may
determine, however, that the discontinuance of aid is sufficient lever-
age to induce compensation or that the foreign policy interests of the
nation require the application of the "act of state" doctrine even if the
1962 Amendment sanctions have not been applied.
CONCLUSION
It is probable that the Hickenlooper Amendments will not induce
adequate compensation for IPC's property. Although some have argued
that the Amendments are ineffective and should be repealed, 75
 it is
submitted that any consideration of their repeal should be postponed
pending the outcome of the IPC situation. At that time the power of
the Amendments to induce compensation for expropriated American
owned property or to prevent further expropriations without compen-
sation can be adequately assessed. The IPC situation is serving as a
test case for Latin American countries contemplating land reform in
the future. The repeal of the Amendments may be interpreted by
foreign countries as an admission of their ineffectiveness and may
result in numerous expropriations of property of American investors
without compensation. In the same sense, if the President does not
impose the sanctions of the 1962 Amendment and imposes the "act of
state" doctrine in an action by IPC under the 1964 Amendment, this
will also illustrate their ineffectiveness in light of foreign policy con-
siderations.
At the present time, the Hickenlooper Amendments represent the
best compromise for insuring the rights of those individuals and cor-
porations who have undertaken capital investments in foreign countries
while maintaining meaningful foreign relations with those countries.
It seems clear, however, that the Congressional intent behind the
Amendments is weighted in favor of the American investor in foreign
countries at the possible expense of foreign relations. The IPC situa-
tion indicates that the importance of foreign relations may frustrate
this Congressional intent.
FRANCES X. HOGAN
75 Several of those testifying on the Peruvian situation felt repealing the Amendments
might be wise. See generally 1969 Hearings, supra note 2.
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